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 Along with the debate over whether World Bank-IMF type programs stimulate 
growth has gone a controversy about the impact of these programs on poverty and income 
distribution.  In a recent article in The World Bank Research Observer, Demery and 
Squire argue that new survey data provide evidence that “poverty was more likely to 
decline in those [African countries] that improved their macroeconomic balances than in 
those that did not” (Demery and Squire 1996, p. 39).  They draw the conclusion that the 
household survey data “...provide the most compelling evidence to date that 
improvements in the macroeconomic policy regime of the kind usually associated with 
World Bank and IMF-supported adjustment programs are consistent with a decline in the 
incidence of poverty overall” (pp. 44-45, emphasis added). They go beyond noting 
“consistency” to assert: 
 
These results do not establish causality, but, at least in the six countries for which 
we have evidence, we can conclude that failure to implement an adjustment 
program has been doubly harmful to the poor - they lose the benefits that 
adjustment can bring, and they suffer worse deprivation under likely alternative 
policy regimes characterized by larger fiscal deficits and overvalued exchange 
rates.  This is a frequent finding of modeling exercises - heterodox polices, often 
designed to protect the poor, end up making matters worse for them.2 
 
 This extremely strong conclusion, that orthodox adjustment results in poverty 
reduction in sub-Saharan Africa, is based upon household expenditure surveys from six 
countries, on the one hand, and the methodology of a World Bank report for quantifying 
changes in macroeconomic policy (World Bank 1994).  The “most compelling evidence 
to date” involves comparing changes in poverty in six countries to changes in an index of 
improvement in macroeconomic policy.  The latter, found in Adjustment in Africa, has 
been widely criticized for its methodological and analytical shortcomings.3 
 
 The surveys upon which the conclusions are drawn are for two years each for six 
countries.  Apparently none of the surveys were specifically designed to test the impact of 
adjustment on poverty.  For three of the countries the first and second surveys were 
carried out by different organizations (in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania).  In terms of 
coverage, the surveys for three countries were “national” (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana 
Tanzania), two surveyed rural areas only (Kenya and Tanzania), and one country’s 
                                                          
1 This paper is published in Journal of International Development, Vol. 9, No. 6  (1997). 
2 Demery and Squire, 1996, p. 46.  Note the implicit and unsupported allegation that heterodox policies 
involve larger fiscal deficits and exchange rate over-valuation.  Despite the reference to ‘heterodox policies’ 
in this quotation and elsewhere, and allusions to ‘critics’ of World Bank structural adjustment polices, the 
authors cite the work of no critics (the only candidate in the list of references is the Oxfam Poverty Report, 
which does not focus on Africa).  Of the thirty-two references, twenty are to studies by the World Bank, 
commissioned by the World Bank, or by World Bank professionals, and seven more are the poverty surveys 
upon which the article is based or statistical sources. 
3 See Mosley, Subasat and Weeks (1995) and Mosley and Weeks (1994), where it is demonstrated that the 
methodology for the Adjustment in Africa indices of policy is unsound and that the econometric results 
using the reported data set are not reproducible. 
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sampling is described as “regional” (Ethiopia).4  The reader is assured that the surveys are 
all broadly representative.  The authors treat them as accurately reflecting changes in 
poverty for each country as a whole,5 therefore consistent with macroeconomic trends. 
 
 The first step in our critique demonstrates that the policy index used by Demery 
and Squire (Demery & Squire 1996, Tables 5 & 6) to indicate whether a country’s macro 
regime was “of the kind usually associated with World Bank and IMF-supported 
adjustment programs” is invalid for its purpose.  This index claims to measure the relative 
improvement in overall macro policy across the six countries, based upon orthodox 
adjustment criteria.  The index derives from the weighted aggregation of three previously 
calculated indices, fiscal policy, monetary policy, and exchange rate policy (see Table 1, 
which gives the direction of change for each index by country and the overall aggregate).  
Both the sub-indices and the aggregate index are ordinal.  At most, they do no more than 
order the countries;  they can not be interpreted as indicating by how much more policy 
improved in one country compared to another.  Therefore, their comparison to a cardinal 
measure (head count of poverty) is problematical. 
 
 More important than this, the weights assigned to the three sub-indices are 
arbitrary:  .37 for fiscal policy, .12 for monetary policy, and .51 for exchange rate policy.6  
One is told: “the final index is a weighted average of performance in each of the three 
areas of policy, the weights reflecting the importance of each component in determining 
growth as revealed by cross-country regression analysis” (Demery & Squire 1996, p. 44).  
they refer readers to an unpublished World Bank working paper for details.7  Without 
inspecting that reference, the reader would know that the weights used are no less 
arbitrary than ones selected out of a hat.  First, each of the three policy indices is itself a 
combination of indices (Demery & Squire 1996, p. 57, footnote 3), which are not 
                                                          
4 We are told, ‘In all but one case, the surveys were designed to be nationally representative or 
representative of the rural population.’  In the one case the authors state, ‘...although it is not nationally 
representative, the survey is sufficiently broad-based to be considered representative of a large section of 
rural Ethiopia’ (Demery & Squire, 1996, p. 41). 
5 Once the poverty statistics are presented in Table 2, Demery and Squire at no point qualify their 
conclusions with respect to the representativeness or accuracy of the surveys for each country as a whole.  
For example, on page 42 they refer to ‘the change in poverty’ and ‘decomposing the change in poverty’.  On 
the following page, they write, ‘But in three cases -- Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania --real expenditure of the 
poorest of the poor declined, even though the incidence of poverty fell nation-wide’ (emphasis added).  For 
Kenya and Tanzania the surveys covered rural areas only (see Table 1). 
6 These weights can be calculated by treating the numbers in Table 5 (‘Index of Changes in Macroeconomic 
Policies (weighted average performance)’) as a system of simultaneous equations.  They are reported in 
footnote 3 of Demery & Squire. 
7 This item is cited as Lawrence Bouton, Christine Jones, and Miguel Kiguel, 1994. ‘Macroeconomic 
Reform in Africa:  ‘Adjustment in Africa’ Revisited,’  Policy research Working Paper 1394, Policy research 
Department, World Bank, Washington, D. C., Processed.  It should be noted that these are not the weights 
used in the original document, ‘Adjustment in Africa’.  Why the one and not the other set of weights is used 
by Demery & Squire is not discussed.  For detailed analysis of the weighting problem in Adjustment in 
Africa, see Mosley, Subasat & Weeks (1995).  The fact that a different set of weights replaced the original 
so quickly after publication of the official document does not inspire confidence in the results. 
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weighted using regression analysis.8  The justification of using simple averages at one 
level of calculation, but regression-generated weights at another is not obvious.  If simple 
averaging was adequate to construct each sub-index, why bother with the regression 
analysis?  Or, if the latter carries such analytical power, why not use it consistently?   
 
 The regression exercise itself is made dubious by its cross-sectional nature, which 
applies the same weights to each country.  Generating the same weight across all 
countries implicitly assumes that the policies operate within a similar framework in all 
countries.  This is clearly not the case.  To take but the most obvious example, some of 
the countries in the cross-sectional regression operated with fixed exchange rates (e.g., 
CFA countries), while others had flexible regimes.  Basic macro theory tells one that 
policy interactions are fundamentally different in the two circumstances;  i.e., it is invalid 
to include then in the same regression if one hopes for meaningful coefficients.  This 
implies a further point:  theory would predict certain positive growth outcomes would be 
associated with a deterioration in the World Bank policy indices.  Consider the case in 
which a government operating under a flexible exchange rate regime increases 
government expenditure through the sale of bonds to the central bank.  From a position of 
general equilibrium, this results in a deterioration in both the fiscal policy index 
(increased deficit) and the monetary policy index (increased money growth via 
monetizing the deficit).  Basic IS/LM/BP analysis tells one that an increase in imports 
results from the excess demand, which puts downward pressure on the exchange rate.  
Under the flexible exchange rate regime a devaluation results, which prompts an 
improvement in the exchange rate policy index.  Given the weights used by Demery and 
Squire, this sequence of events could reward the country with an overall improvement in 
its macro policy index, even though the aggregate improvement was achieved, indeed 
initiated, by the violation of World Bank principles of sound fiscal and monetary policy!  
In Table 1 (from Demery and Squire, Table 5) we find exactly this combination for 
Ethiopia.  In the same vein, let government pursue a loose monetary policy (the index 
deteriorates), which (again) provokes a devaluation (the index improves).  If exports 
respond quickly, the economy expands, which induces an increase in public sector 
revenues (fiscal policy index improves).  Again, an overall improvement in policy 
performance follows from an initial violation of “sound” macro policy.  There are two 
such cases in Table 1, Kenya and Nigeria.  Of course, other theoretical stories can be told 
for these three countries.9  That is precisely the point:  the indices are so theoretically 
                                                          
8 Fiscal policy combines the change in the fiscal deficit and total state revenue.  One reads,  ‘If the change in 
total revenues was less than -4 [percent], the fiscal score was decreased by 1;  if the change was greater than 
three, the score was increased by 1’ (Demery&Squire 1996, p. 57, footnote 3).  One might ask, what is the 
theoretical basis of these percentage ranges?  And, why increase (decrease) by unit, rather than some other 
ordinal number?  The monetary policy index combines changes in the money supply and the rate of 
inflation.  In this case, ‘The overall monetary policy score was, where possible, a simple average of [the 
two]’ (Ibid.).  The exchange rate index included both the real effective exchange rate and the parallel 
market premium on the official exchange rate, ‘as a simple average’ (Ibid.).  In each case theory tells one 
that the two combined measures are not independent of each other, biasing the outcome. 
9 The two stories here have superficial credibility in part because the indices used by Demery and Squire 
make no attempt to sort out time lags, between policies or between policies and performance.  Each index 
refers to the same time period with no reference to possible disequilibria at the outset or end of the periods.  
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ambiguous that their interpretations are many and varied.  They do not show that “recent 
history in this handful of African countries...suggests close links between poverty on the 
one hand and macroeconomic balances and growth on the other” (Demery & Squire 1996, 
p. 46). 
 
 Weights should not be determined on the basis of regression analysis alone;  they 
must be first derived theoretically.  Without a theoretical foundation, the weights, even 
should they show high statistical significance, may represent a correlation as spurious as 
an empirical link between sightings of storks and incidents of human births.  The 
regression weights are arbitrary, because all theory tells one that the three indices may be 
both interactive (in which case treating them as separate results in biased statistics) and 
any two derivative from the third (they are not independent variables).   For example, if 
one holds to a strict New Classical theory of aggregate general equilibrium, economies 
are constrained by the monetary supply;  thus, the weight on monetary policy would be 
unity and the other weights zero.10  Further, if one held to the operation of the law of one 
price, then the exchange rate weight should be zero, independently of the theory 
determining the weights on fiscal and monetary policy.  A statistical exercise might show 
spurious and significant correlation for all three indices, due to time lags and the impact 
of non-policy influences.  Non-theoretical regression weights are worse than those drawn 
from a hat, because they carry an undeserved aura of verisimilitude for unwitting non-
specialists, who, to a great extent, are the intended users of the World Bank policy 
conclusions.    
 
 Once the weights are revealed as arbitrary, the alleged relationship between policy 
performance and poverty (Table 6 in Demery & Squire) collapses.  One observes in Table 
1 that for only two of the six countries are the three policy changes all non-negative  
(Ghana and Tanzania).  For two other countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ethiopia, two of the 
three are negative, yet the aggregate index for the former is negative and positive for the 
latter.  This is purely an artifact of the arbitrary aggregation procedure, with no clear 
policy implication.  Figure 1 demonstrates this point.  Assume there be two policy 
indices, and a country in time period 0 scores 2,1 (point a), and in time period 1 scores 
1,2 (point b).  If the weights are in the ratio 2:1, then the overall index measures an 
deterioration in policy (line w1);  but an equal weighting shows no change (line w2);  and 
a 1:2 weighting reports that policy has improved (line w3).  Four of the six  countries 
suffer from this ambiguity (the two mentioned above plus Kenya and Nigeria, whose 
overall outcome is given in bold type), which is unavoidable in the absence of 
theoretically determined weights. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The failure to consider initial and final conditions implies that the index presumes that the economies were 
in general equilibrium at the terminal dates. 
10 Of the three indices, only that for monetary policy seems to have a theoretical basis, because it assigns the 
highest score to a near-zero change in the ratio of the money supply to GDP (Demery&Squire 1996, p. 57, 
footnote 3). This rule is implied if one assumes money to be neutral. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 Having demonstrated that little information is conveyed by the macroeconomic 
policy indices, we turn to the other key measure in the Demery and Squire article, the 
poverty measures.  Our procedure is initially to accept that these surveys are individually 
and collectively representative of each country as a whole, and then demonstrate that the 
poverty figures are inconsistent with generally-accepted statistics on per capita income 
growth (produced by the World Bank itself).  We find it surprising that Demery and 
Squire did not carry out this simple and basic consistency check.  The first step in the 
analysis is to inspect the measured poverty levels, given in the first two data columns of 
Table 2.  The “Year 1” column gives the percentage of household in poverty by the “head 
count” method.  Poverty in each “Year 1” survey was defined as that percentage of 
households with expenditure below a given fraction of “mean expenditure” for the sample 
as a whole (Demery & Squire 1996, pp. 41-42).11  As data column four shows, this 
fraction is .54 for Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and .5, .67, and .41 for Ghana, 
Nigeria and Tanzania, respectively.  Let the absolute expenditure implied by these 
fractions be: EPi,t=1 = αiEMi,t=1 (poverty level expenditure for country i equals the 
arbitrary fraction for each country, times mean expenditure in year 1).  The absolute 
expenditure level implied by this fraction of mean expenditure is carried forward as the 
poverty line to the “Year 2” survey, providing an absolute poverty measure which is the 
same for both years (at least in principle).  Thus, the percentage for “Target Year 1” is the 
proportion of households in that year measured to have expenditure below αiEMi,t=1.   
 
 In their article Demery and Squire provide a “decomposition” of the change in 
poverty, between the “effect of changes in economic growth” and the “effect of changes 
in inequality” (see p. 43, Table 3).  The data column “Growth Only” reports the former;  
i.e., the level of poverty in the second survey on the assumption of no distributional 
changes.12  This decomposition is key to the empirical critique below.  Before employing 
it for our calculations, we note that by providing the decomposition, Demery and Squire 
offer support evidence for one of the most important heterodox critiques of orthodox 
adjustment:  that these programs are associated with an increase in the inequality of 
income.  In four of the five countries with improved indicators (all but Ghana), the 
decomposition shows that income growth was associated with greater inequality.  For 
Kenya and Tanzania, the effect is staggering:  over half of the growth-generated reduction 
in poverty is wiped out by increased inequality.  Such a finding might prompt some to 
seriously consider alternative adjustment strategies.  However, neither should the 
multilaterals be chagrined or the critics smug about this result.  As shown below, the 
poverty statistics are highly suspect, in as far as they purport to measures changes at the 
national level.13 
 
                                                          
11 Demery and Squire repeatedly use ‘income’ interchangeably with ‘expenditure’. 
12 It is to be stressed that this decomposition is taken from the Demery and Squire article. 
13 The last phase is important.  It is not the intent to criticise the poverty surveys, but to criticise their use in 




[Table 2 about here] 
 
 Armed with the “growth only” effect on poverty, one can proceed to calculate the 
per capita expenditure increase (decrease for Cote d’Ivoire) necessarily implied by the 
reported reductions (rise for Cote d’Ivoire) in poverty between the two surveys for each 
country.  If there is no change in the distribution of income, the expenditure increase 
(decrease) is equal to the difference between the absolute poverty line  (αiEMi,t=1) and 
the expenditure level in Year 1 which corresponds to the “growth only” level of  poverty 
for Year 2.  The household expenditure level associated with the “growth only” level of 
poverty (“Target”) can be written as 
 
EPi,t=2 = αi(1+γ)EMi,t=1 
 
 Where γ is the required growth of per capita expenditure.  In other words, with no 
change in distribution, poverty is reduced by per capita income rising past successive 
percentage points of the household distribution.  The only unknown in this equation are 
EPi,t=2 and γ.  If EPi,t=2 is established, the implied growth rate, γ, can be calculated.  To 
determine EPi,t=2 we need to know the cumulative distribution of poverty households 
over the range of household expenditure which includes that for target poverty level and 
the poverty line (αiEMi,t=1);  that is, the relevant distributional function.
14  Figures 2 and 
3 show two possible distribution functions for the Kenya data.  The points (10.1, 27) and 
(51.5, 54)15 in each figure are those provided by Demery and Squire.  In Figure 2 the 
distribution function is assumed to be linear between the known points;  in Figure 3, it is 
assumed to be linear in logarithms of household expenditure.  The X-axis is placed to 
intersect the Y-axis at the Year 2 poverty level.  Thus, the intersection of the X-axis with 
the cumulative distribution gives the level of expenditure in Year 1 that correspond to the 
Year 2 poverty level.  For Kenya the expenditure levels in Year 1 associated with the 
“growth only” reduction in poverty for Year 2 are .500EM and .486EM, respectively.  
The difference between these and the poverty line, .54EM for Kenya, is the increase 
required in per capita expenditure to achieve the Year 2 level of poverty.   
 
[Figures 2 and 3 go about here] 
 
 For simplicity, we shall use the estimate implied by the strictly linear functions. 
Inspection of the assumed distribution functions for Kenya and the other countries shows 
                                                          
14 For all the countries except Ethiopia, Demery and Squire provide two points on the distribution:  the 
point for the poverty line (e.g., .54EM for Kenya) and a ‘hard-core poverty line’, defined as poorest ten 
percent of households for Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, 10.2 percent for Ghana, 10.1 percent for Kenya, and 
10.3 percent for Tanzania.  By definition we know a third point, where mean expenditure and the proportion 
in poverty are both zero.  See Demery & Squire 1996, p. 44 (Table 4), where the percentage in ‘hard-core’ 
poverty and associated percentages of mean expenditure are given. 
15 For each pair the poverty percentage is given first and the percentage of mean expenditure second. 
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that a simple linear approximation must understate the necessary change in expenditure, 
since the cumulative distributions are convex in form.  Therefore, we can be confident 
that our estimates of the implied growth rate are not overstatements.  Data column five in 
Table 2 gives the fraction of mean expenditure in Year 1 corresponding to the Year target 
poverty level, followed by the change in household expenditure required to reach that 
poverty target.  The penultimate column gives two measures of the change in per capita 
income over the relevant periods.16 The top number is from the World Bank data base 
“Stars”, which measures per capita GDP in US dollars.  Demery and Squire prefer a 
measure in constant units of the domestic currency, which appears as the bottom 
number.17  In several cases the difference between the measures is notable, even startling.  
To avoid bickering over which data series is appropriate, the discussion below uses the 
numbers preferred by Demery and Squire.  
 
 The essential point is:  if the Demery and Squire link between macro orthodoxy 
and poverty be credible, then the changes in poverty across countries must be consistent 
with the changes in per capita income.  They are not.  For two countries, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania, the per capita expenditure change implied in the poverty surveys differs from 
the preferred measure of per capita income change by over fifty percentage points.  For 
two more countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya, the percentage point difference is much 
lower, but still in double digits.  Only for Ghana and Kenya are the two statistics credibly 
similar.  It would be obvious even to the novice that a discrepancy between the 
expenditure and income changes undermines the poverty estimates, as shown in the final 
column of Table 2.  There, we have calculated the poverty level implied by the per capita 
income change (based on the numbers endorsed by Demery and Squire).  In order to 
assess whether the survey poverty statistics or the per-capita-income-implied poverty 
statistics are significantly different, one needs a relatively non-arbitrary criterion.  For this 
purpose we assume that the survey poverty measures have a margin of error of ten percent 
each way, at an acceptable level of statistical confidence.  With this criteria, for only two 
of the countries, Ghana and Kenya, are the two estimates of poverty in the second survey 
year not significantly different (see data columns three and eight).  For the other four 
countries, the hypothesis that poverty declined as measured by the survey cannot be 
confirmed, implying that the link between orthodox macro policy and poverty reduction 
is also not confirmed (noted as “denied” in the table).  But the hypothesis must also be 
judged as not confirmed for Kenya, because with such a margin of error one cannot 
exclude the possibility that poverty was at the same level in year 1 and year 2.  The more 
accurate the surveys (smaller the assumed margin of error), the more strongly is the 
Demery and Squire hypothesis rejected;  the larger the margin of error, the weaker is their 
statistical evidence.  Thus, for five of the six countries, statistical inference dictates that 
the relationship between macro orthodoxy and poverty reduction has not been established. 
 
                                                          
16 While per capita expenditure and per capita national income are not the same thing, one would expect a 
rather close correspondence. 
17 The numbers for ‘GDP per capita in constant 1987 local currency’ came via the editor of this journal, 
from one of the authors of the article under criticism. 
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 There are two possible reasons for the discrepancies between the results of the 
surveys and the World Bank national income statistics.  First, it may be that the surveys 
are inaccurate or accurate but not representative of income and expenditure changes at the 
national level.  If this is the case, then conclusions cannot be drawn about the effect of 
macroeconomic policy on poverty;  i.e., the Demery and Squire argument stalls from the 
outset.  A second possibility is that the surveys accurately represent changes at the 
national level, but the World Bank data base is grossly inaccurate for four of the six 
countries covered by the surveys.  If this possibility is entertained, the implications are, if 
anything, more unpleasant.  It implies that the statistics used by hundreds of researchers 
and the World Bank itself cannot be taken seriously.  This would mean, for example, that 
the attempt by the World Bank in Adjustment in Africa to relate macroeconomic policy 
performance to growth was fundamentally flawed on data grounds alone. 
 
 As a final point, we note that seven of the seventeen text pages of the Demery and 
Squire article are devoted to a comparison of the performances of Cote d’Ivoire and 
Ghana, with the former compared unfavorably to the latter.  In the absence of reliable 
evidence from other countries, even a rigorous comparison of two countries need carry no 
lessons for the rest of the sub Saharan region.  However, the comparison is far from 
rigorous.  More serious than the lack of a clear analytical framework for making the 
comparison is that it refers experience over two different time periods, 1985-1988 for 
Cote d’Ivoire and 1988-1992 for Ghana.  This alone renders the discussion 
impressionistic and subjective. 
 
 If the statistics provided by Demery and Squire provide the most “compelling 
evidence to date” that World Bank-IMF type adjustment programs are consistent with 
poverty reduction, then the implication for the other evidence is unflattering.  Elsewhere 
it has been shown that the evidence that World Bank programs foster economic growth in 
Africa is unconvincing (Mosley, Subasat & Weeks 1995).  Demery and Squire have 
shown, albeit inadvertently, that the same conclusion holds for the evidence that these 
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Table 1:  Direction of Change of “Index of Macroeconomic 
 Policies” (between survey years) 















Cote d’Ivoire minus plus minus minus 
Ethiopia minus minus plus plus 
Ghana no change plus plus plus 
Kenya plus minus plus plus 
Nigeria plus minus plus plus 
Tanzania plus plus plus plus 
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                            w2 (1:1), a = b 
         w1              w3 (1:2), a < b 
3                                     
                                         
 
2                a 
 
                                   w3 
1                            w2 
                              b 
 
                                                                                  Policy 




Table 2:  Poverty Measures and Expenditure/Income Changes  






























































































































































“Confirmed” or “denied” in the last column refers to the Demery & Squire hypothesis:  poverty declined in 
the country in question (except for Cote d’Ivoire where an increase is predicted). 
By columns: 
1. The years in which the surveys were done are given below the country names. 
2. “Year 1, survey” is the reported level of poverty for Year 1. 
3. “Year 2, survey” is the reported level of poverty for Year 2. 
4. “Year 2, Growth only” is the level of poverty implied by no distributional change (Demery & Squire 
1996, p. 43, Table 3).  
5. “Poverty expend, fraction of mean, Year 1” is the fraction of “mean expenditure” at which the poverty 
line was set (Demery & Squire 1996, p. 42, Table 2). 
6. “Poverty expend, fraction of mean, Target Year 1” is the fraction of mean expenditure necessary such 
that the Year 2 “growth only” poverty proportion would hold (see text). 
7. “Implied expend increase, growth only” is the increase in mean expenditure from Year 1 to Year 2 that 
would achieve the Year 2 growth only poverty percentage.  Via the editor of The World Bank Research 
Observer, I received the communication that Demery & Squire judge that these estimates “are not far off the 
actuals (computed from the household survey data), except for Tanzania”.  The appropriate estimate for 
Tanzania from the household surveys was not provided in the communication.  In the absence thereof (and 
the method of calculation) the Tanzania estimate remains in the table. 
8. “Per cap income increase Wd Bk Data Base” gives as the top number the change in per capita income in 
dollars (World Bank Atlas method), and the bottom number in constant prices of the local currency.  The 
latter was not calculated by the author, but provided by Demery & Squire via the editor of this journal. 
9.  “Poverty level for income increase Wd Bk Data Base” is the poverty level implied by the per capita 
income increases provided by Demery and Squire (see note to column 8). 
Sources: 
Data columns 1-4 are from Demery & Squire 1996, Tables 2 and 3.  Columns 5 and 6 are calculations 
based on the previous columns, other information in the article, and use of simple distribution functions (see 
text).  The last two columns are explained above. 
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Figure 1:  Kenya:  Cumulative Poverty Percentage 
by Fraction of Mean Expenditure 1982













0 10 20 30 40 50 60













Figure 2:  Kenya:  Cumulative Poverty Percentage by 
Proportion (Log) of Mean Expenditure 1982
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